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Summary 
A South Korean consortium recently signed a contract to provide four commercial nuclear 
reactors to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), signaling a new role for South Korea in the world 
nuclear energy market. The $20 billion deal indicates that South Korea has completed the 
transition from passive purchaser of turn-key nuclear plants in the 1970s to major nuclear 
technology supplier, capable of competing with the largest and most experienced nuclear 
technology companies in the world. The South Korean government reportedly has established a 
goal for South Korea to capture 20% of the world nuclear power plant market during the next 20 
years, and the importance placed by Seoul on the UAE contract was underscored by South 
Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s presence at the signing ceremony in the UAE. 
In the 1970s, South Korea launched its nuclear power program through the government-owned 
Korea Electric Company (now Korea Electric Power Corporation, KEPCO), which purchased the 
country’s first nuclear power units from Westinghouse. In the early years of the Korean nuclear 
program, Westinghouse and other foreign suppliers delivered completed plants with minimal 
Korean industry input. After the first three units, Korean firms took over the construction work on 
subsequent plants, although the reactor systems, turbine-generators, and architect/engineering 
services continued to be provided primarily by non-Korean companies. In 1987, KEPCO 
embarked on an effort to establish a standard Korean design, selecting the System 80 design from 
the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering as the basis. Combustion Engineering won the 
competition for the Korean standard design contract by agreeing to full technology transfer, 
according to KEPCO. The technology transfer program resulted in the development of the APR-
1400 power plant, which is the design purchased by the UAE. 
In the UAE deal, the South Korean consortium is headed by KEPCO and includes other major 
Korean industrial companies that are involved in Korea’s rapidly growing domestic nuclear 
power plant construction program. The consortium also includes Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse 
Electric Company, which currently owns the U.S. design on which the Korean design is based, 
and the Japanese industrial conglomerate Toshiba, which now owns most of Westinghouse. 
Because the AP-1400 is based on a U.S. design, U.S. export controls will continue to apply. 
Westinghouse plans to seek the necessary authorization from the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) to transfer the technology to the UAE. The UAE recently reached a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with the United States in which the country agreed not to develop fuel cycle facilities 
to support its planned nuclear power program, which could ease weapons proliferation concerns. 
The UAE program may establish a precedent for U.S. policy on future Korean exports to non-
nuclear power nations, which is likely to be of continuing congressional interest. 
The Korea-UAE nuclear plant sale also has been cited by the Korean news media as an important 
consideration in upcoming negotiations on the renewal of the U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation 
agreement, a prerequisite under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act for nuclear trade. The 
current agreement expires in 2014, and the first discussions on renewal are likely within the next 
year. Congress will have an opportunity to review any new agreement before it takes effect. 
 
 
U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Contents 
Introduction: South Korea’s New World Role..............................................................................1 
Domestic South Korean Nuclear Energy Program .......................................................................2 
South Korean Nuclear Plant Export Program...............................................................................5 
UAE Reactor Contract ..........................................................................................................5 
Korean and U.S. Partnership .................................................................................................6 
Outlook for Korean Exports ..................................................................................................7 
U.S. Policy Considerations..........................................................................................................9 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. South Korean Nuclear Power Units ..............................................................................3 
 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 11 
 
U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market 
 
Congressional Research Service 1 
Introduction: South Korea’s New World Role 
South Korean consortium recently signed a contract to provide four commercial nuclear reactors 
to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), signaling a new role for South Korea in the world nuclear 
energy market. The $20 billion deal indicates that South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK) has 
completed the transition from passive purchaser of turn-key nuclear plants in the 1970s to major 
nuclear technology supplier, now capable of competing with the largest and most experienced 
nuclear technology companies in the world. 
Because the plants being exported by South Korea are based on a U.S. design, U.S. export 
controls will continue to apply. Westinghouse plans to seek the necessary authorization from the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to transfer the technology to the UAE. The UAE recently 
reached a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in which the country agreed not 
to develop fuel cycle facilities to support its planned nuclear power program, which could ease 
weapons proliferation concerns. The UAE program may establish a precedent for U.S. policy on 
future Korean exports to non-nuclear power nations, which is likely to be of continuing 
congressional interest. 
The Korea-UAE nuclear plant sale has been cited by the Korean news media as an important 
consideration in upcoming negotiations on the renewal of the U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation 
agreement, a prerequisite under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act for nuclear trade. Korean 
newspaper editorials have suggested that Korea’s first foreign sale of nuclear technology could 
pave the way for U.S. agreement for Korean reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, which is currently 
not permitted. The Korean Minister of the Knowledge Economy called for Korea to achieve 
“peaceful nuclear sovereignty” under future U.S. agreements.1 The current agreement expires in 
2014, and the first discussions on renewal are likely within the next year. Congress will have an 
opportunity to review any new agreement before it takes effect. 
South Korea’s nuclear technology progression has been similar to the earlier nuclear paths of 
France and Japan, and which appears likely to be followed in the future by China. France, Japan, 
and now South Korea developed their nuclear power industries with technology and designs 
licensed from U.S. companies to supply domestic energy needs. In each case, the licensees 
assumed progressively greater responsibility for construction of the U.S.-designed units and 
eventually the engineering and design as well. The foreign firms now compete for nuclear plant 
contracts throughout the world, including the United States, either in consortia with their former 
U.S. licensors or independently. 
In the UAE deal, the South Korean consortium is headed by government-owned Korea Electric 
Power Corporation (KEPCO) and includes other major Korean industrial companies that are 
involved in Korea’s rapidly growing domestic nuclear power plant construction program. The 
consortium also includes Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse Electric Company, which currently 
owns the U.S. design on which the Korean design is based, and the Japanese industrial 
conglomerate Toshiba, which now owns most of Westinghouse. 
                                               
1 “Seoul Wants ‘Sovereignty’ in Peaceful Nuclear Development,” Chosun Ilbo, December 31, 2009. 
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Although Korean companies now take the lead on design and construction of Korea’s nuclear 
power plants, Westinghouse still provides support under the design license. Such support 
typically includes components, instrumentation and control equipment, and technical and 
engineering services. The Korean plant to be built in the UAE, the APR-1400 model, is a 
modified version of the System 80+ design developed by the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering 
(C-E), which was later acquired by Westinghouse. Westinghouse has estimated that its work 
under the UAE contract could total $1 billion.2 
Domestic South Korean Nuclear Energy Program 
When the construction of South Korea’s first commercial nuclear power plant began in 1972, the 
South Korean economy was about 7.5% the size of Japan’s, and the country’s per-capita income 
was slightly lower than that of North Korea.3 With such a relatively small industrial base, South 
Korea’s plans to finance and operate a fleet of nuclear power plants could have been considered 
overly ambitious, and its long-term plans to master the new technology might have seemed 
unrealistic. But the subsequent growth of the South Korean economy—with per-capita income 
now rivaling other developed nations and GDP nearly 20% of Japan’s—turned out to be more 
than sufficient to sustain the country’s planned nuclear power development. 
South Korea launched its nuclear power program through the government-owned Korea Electric 
Company (now Korea Electric Power Corporation, KEPCO), which purchased the country’s first 
nuclear power units from Westinghouse. Those first plants were ordered on a turn-key basis, in 
which the foreign supplier delivered a completed plant with minimal Korean industry input. As 
shown in Figure 1, the first of these turn-key units, Kori 1, began operating in 1978. 
Westinghouse supplied the reactor and other components of the nuclear steam supply system 
(NSSS) and constructed the plant, and other western firms provided the turbine-generator and 
architect/engineering services. Wolsong 1 and Kori 2, coming on line in 1983, were also turn-key 
units, with all major components and construction services provided primarily by non-Korean 
companies. 
After those first three units, Korean firms took over the construction work on subsequent plants, 
beginning with Kori 3, which began commercial operation in 1985. However, the NSSS, turbine-
generators, and architect/engineering services continued to be provided primarily by non-Korean 
companies, including Westinghouse, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and the French 
firm Framatome, which had previously licensed its design from Westinghouse. That arrangement 
continued for the next six units, which came on line from 1995-1999. 
In 1987, KEPCO embarked on an effort to establish a standard Korean design, selecting the 
System 80 design from the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering (C-E) as the basis.4 The System 80 
design had been used for three identical units nearing completion at Palo Verde, Arizona.  
                                               
2 E-mail from Jeanne T. Lopatto, Vice President, Government and International Affairs, Westinghouse Electric 
Company, January 5, 2010. 
3 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2006, pp. 298-306. 
4 World Nuclear Association, South Korea Country Report, January 7, 2010, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
inf81.html. 
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Figure 1. South Korean Nuclear Power Units 
Major Categories of Work Conducted By Domestic and Foreign Companies 
 
Source: Nuclear News, World List of Nuclear Power Plants, March 2009. 
 
Combustion Engineering won the competition for the Korean standard design contract by 
agreeing to full technology transfer, according to KEPCO. The U.S. contractors for the turbine-
generators (General Electric) and architect/engineering services (Sargent & Lundy) agreed to 
transfer key technology as well. 
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All of the major U.S. companies working on the new C-E plants agreed to serve as subcontractors 
to Korean firms: Combustion Engineering to Hanjung (now Doosan), General Electric (GE) also 
to Hanjung, and Sargent & Lundy (S&L) to Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC), 
which is majority owned by KEPCO.5 Yonggwang 3 and 4 and Ulchin 3 and 4, which began 
operating from 1995 to 1999, were constructed under that arrangement. A similar partnership was 
formed with Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to build Wolsong 2-4, completed during 
1997 through 1999. Plant construction continued to be carried out by Korean companies. 
Components and work shared by Korean and foreign firms is shown in Figure 1. 
Korean reactor designers worked with C-E, which became part of Westinghouse in 2000, to 
develop a standard Korean design from the System 80 model. This effort resulted in the 1,000 
megawatt Optimized Power Reactor (OPR-1000). The four OPR-1000 units that have been 
completed since 1999, Yonggwang 5-6 and Ulchin 5-6, were been built and constructed almost 
entirely by Korean firms. However, some key components continued to be supplied or heavily 
supported by non-Korean firms, constituting a small percentage of each nuclear unit’s total cost. 
Development of a larger and more advanced model of the Korean standard design was based on 
the C-E System 80+ design that received U.S. standard design certification from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in May 1997. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(KAERI) helped develop the U.S. design,6 complementing work on the Korean version of the 
design that began in 1992. The Korean design was largely completed by 1999 and was designated 
the APR-1400.7 
South Korea currently has eight nuclear units under construction, four OPR-1000s and four APR-
1400s, to be completed between 2010 and 2016. Four more APR-1400s are to be completed 
between 2018 and 2021. That construction program would increase the country’s nuclear power 
reactors from 20 to 32, and nuclear power generating capacity from 17,700 megawatts to 32,500 
megawatts. South Korea’s long-term electricity plan calls for increasing nuclear capacity to 
42,700 megawatts by 2030, the equivalent of about seven additional APR-1400s after 2021.8 
South Korea generated 36% of its electricity from nuclear plants in 2008 and plans to increase 
that share to 59% by 2030.9 
Ever since South Korea completed the first nuclear unit in which Korean firms participated in all 
phases of development—Yonggwang 3 in 1995—the country has opened an average of about one 
unit every 18 months. Starting after the most recent reactor began commercial operation in 2005, 
Ulchin 6, South Korea plans to complete an average of about one reactor every 16 months 
through 2021, and potentially about one reactor per year from 2022 to 2030. With the planned 
rate of domestic nuclear plant construction remaining fairly stable, it would appear that any 
significant expansion of South Korea’s nuclear engineering and construction industry would 
depend on exports. 
                                               
5 Gary Baker and Shin Ho-Chul, “Korean Utility and Three U.S. Firms Ink Nuclear Building Deal,” Nucleonics Week, 
April 16, 1987, p. 5. 
6 National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Power: Technical and Institutional Options for the Future, Washington, DC, 
1992, p. 100. 
7 World Nuclear Association, op. cit. 
8 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Nuclear Power and R&D Programs in Korea, Presentation to CRS visitors, 
Daejeon, South Korea, July 27, 2009, pp. 11-12. 
9 Jae-min Ahn, “Industry Perspectives on Korean Nuclear Program,” Presentation to U.S.-ROK Workshop on Nuclear 
Energy and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, January 20, 2010. 
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South Korean Nuclear Plant Export Program 
The South Korean government expects KEPCO’s reactor sale to the UAE to constitute the leading 
edge of a much larger nuclear power marketing effort throughout the world. According to news 
media reports, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), which is responsible for industrial 
and trade policy, has established a goal for South Korea to capture 20% of the world nuclear 
power plant market during the next 20 years. Based on an estimated world market of about 400 
large commercial reactors through 2030, a 20% penetration would result in South Korean exports 
of 80 reactors during the next 20 years, with an estimated value of $400 billion.10 
UAE Reactor Contract 
As South Korea’s first foreign reactor sale, the UAE contract is likely to establish a template for 
future exports. The companies involved in the UAE project appear to be the same ones that are 
currently building Korean domestic nuclear plants and are likely to play similar roles in the 
export program. The importance placed by the ROK government on the contract was underscored 
by the presence of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak at the signing ceremony in the UAE 
December 27, 2009, along with UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahayan.11 
The selection of the KEPCO consortium was made by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation 
(ENEC), which will oversee the contract’s implementation. According to a statement issued by 
ENEC, the contract includes the following major provisions:12 
• The KEPCO consortium will design, build, help operate and maintain, and 
provide initial fuel for four APR-1400 nuclear units at a total cost of about $20 
billion. A “high percentage of the contract” will be under a fixed price. 
• Korean investors will have an equity interest in the UAE plants. 
• The first unit is to begin commercial operation in 2017, with the other three to be 
completed by 2020. 
• Extensive training, human resources development, and education is to be 
provided to allow UAE to eventually provide most of the nuclear plant staffing 
and develop commercial infrastructure and support businesses. 
• A potential follow-on contract for long-term operation and maintenance of the 
units, worth as much as another $20 billion over 60 years,13 is under discussion 
with KEPCO and other vendors. 
The Korean consortium was selected over two other proposals, from Areva and General Electric-
Hitachi. According to media reports, the decision was strongly affected by price. One report 
                                               
10 World Nuclear News. “South Korea Weeks to Boost Reactor Exports,” January 13, 2010, http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/NP-South_Korea_seeks_to_boost_reactor_exports-1301104.html. 
11 Amena Bakr, “South Korean Group Wins $40bn UAE Nuclear Deal,” Arabian Business.com, December 27, 2009. 
12 Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, “UAE Selects Korea Electric Power Corp. Team as Prime Contractor for 
Peaceful Nuclear Power Program,” press release, December 27, 2009, http://www.enec.gov.ae/news/uae-selects-korea-
electric-power-corp-team-as-prime-contractor-f/. 
13 Bakr, op. cit. 
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indicated that the KEPCO total of $20 billion was 30% lower than the Areva bid, which in turn 
was lower than the GE-Hitachi offer.14 Another report described KEPCO’s price as $16 billion 
lower than Areva’s.15 KEPCO’s bid averages out to $5 billion per reactor, which is higher than a 
reported estimate of $3.15 billion for each of two APR-1400s being built at the Shin-Kori site in 
Korea, with the difference ascribed to the additional costs of operating in a country with no 
previous nuclear experience.16 The $20 billion cost of 4,200 megawatts of electric generating 
capacity works out to $3,571 per kilowatt, which is similar to the average of recent comparable 
U.S. estimates for new nuclear plants. (See CRS Report RL34746, Power Plants: Characteristics 
and Costs, by Stan Mark Kaplan.) 
Korean and U.S. Partnership 
As noted above, the Korean and U.S. companies involved in the UAE project have worked 
together extensively in the past on the domestic Korean nuclear power program, with Korean 
firms gradually taking over most of the work. Below are the members of the KEPCO consortium 
and their roles in the UAE project: 
• KEPCO. Prime contractor and project integration. According to the ENEC 
announcement, “KEPCO is expected to begin mobilizing its team in Abu Dhabi 
immediately.” 
• Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company (KHNP). Operating company for 
Korean nuclear power plants. To serve as engineering, procurement, and 
construction contractor and operator. KEPCO subsidiary. 
• KOPEC. Nuclear power plant architect/engineering services. Majority owned by 
KEPCO. 
• Korea Nuclear Fuel Company (KNF). Initial nuclear fuel loads. 
• Korea Plant Service and Engineering Company (KPS). Plant maintenance.17 
Majority owned by KEPCO. 
• Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction. Fabrication of nuclear steam supply 
system and other major components. 
• Samsung C&T Corporation. Plant construction. 
• Hyundai Engineering and Construction. Plant construction. 
• Westinghouse Electric Company. Technical and engineering support services and 
various components. 
• Toshiba Corporation. Majority owner of Westinghouse. Role unspecified. 
Possible component supply and technical consulting. 
                                               
14 Chris Stanton, “Nuclear Bid to Be Industry Norm,” The National, December 28, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091228/BUSINESS/712289928. 
15 Bakr, op. cit. 
16 Stanton, op. cit. 
17 “KEPCO to Provide Design, Construction and Maintenance of Nuclear Reactors,” Khaleej Times Online, December 
28, 2009. 
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Westinghouse has projected that its share of the contract will be as much as $1 billion, or about 
5% of the total, generating or sustaining several hundred U.S. jobs. Westinghouse has not 
released the specific scope of its activities under the contract, except that it may include the 
supply of plant components, man-machine interface systems, instrumentation and control 
equipment, and technical and engineering support services.18 The estimated Westinghouse share 
of the UAE contract is similar to its reported share of the construction of the two Shin-Kori APR-
1400s, about $300 million. Specific reactor components being provided by Westinghouse under 
the 2006 Shin-Kori contract include reactor coolant pumps and motors, reactor vessel internals, 
and control element drive mechanisms.19 
Although most of the U.S. technology involved in the Korean standard reactor designs (OPR-
1000 and APR-1400) has been successfully transferred to Korean firms as called for by the initial 
C-E licensing agreement in 1987, Westinghouse still considers the Korean reactors to be 
Westinghouse-licensed products. As a result, the UAE reactor sale will be subject to U.S. export 
control requirements.20 
Westinghouse is also partnering with Korean industry to produce control element assemblies for 
C-E reactor designs, including U.S. and Korean nuclear power plants, as well as the UAE plants 
and other potential Korean exports. The joint venture between Westinghouse and KNF is being 
located at the KNF fuel fabrication plant in Daejeon, Korea, and will be 55% owned by 
Westinghouse.21 
Outlook for Korean Exports 
The goal set by the Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy for a 20% South Korean share of 
the global nuclear power plant market would place South Korea about equal to Russia and behind 
only France and the United States in the nuclear market, according to a ministry report to 
President Lee. “Nuclear power-related business will be the most profitable market after 
automobiles, semiconductors, and shipbuilding,” the report said. MKE also called for South 
Korean firms to expand their share of the estimated $78 billion world market for operation, 
maintenance, and repair of nuclear power plants. MKE announced an interim goal of signing 
contracts to export six more Korean nuclear units, in addition to the four purchased by the UAE, 
by 2012.22 
The UAE contract added substantial credibility to MKE’s export goals and changed the dynamics 
of the world nuclear power market. Kuwaiti officials were paraphrased as saying the UAE price 
“is likely to become a benchmark for atomic energy technology across the region.”23 After losing 
the UAE contract, Areva was reported to be examining ways to modify its plant design to cut 
                                               
18 Lopatto, op. cit. 
19 “Two New Nuclear Plants for South Korea,” Nuclear Engineering International, September 6, 2006. 
20 Lopatto, op. cit. 
21 April Murelio, “Westinghouse, KNF Team to Manufacture Control Element Assemblies,” Nuclear Power Industry 
News, February 9, 2009. 
22 World Nuclear News, op. cit. 
23 Stanton, op. cit. 
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costs, such as by cutting the number of steam generators from four to two by making them larger, 
as in the Korean design.24 
Other potential Korean export deals are under consideration in Indonesia and the United States, 
Westinghouse’s home market. Other countries that have been mentioned in the news media 
include Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Middle East neighbors of the UAE.25 A Korean 
consortium has reportedly been selected by Jordan to build the kingdom’s first research reactor.26 
KNHP signed a preliminary agreement with Indonesian energy firm Medco Energi in July 2007 
to build Korean-design reactors in Indonesia.27 A feasibility study is currently underway for four 
OPR-1000 units that could begin operating by 2016.28 However, Japanese firms are reportedly 
also under consideration.29 A U.S. energy development company, Alternate Energy Holdings 
Incorporated (AEHI), announced in January 2010 that it was negotiating with South Korean 
officials on an agreement to build APR-1400 nuclear units at proposed sites in Idaho and 
Colorado. An AEHI news release said, “We expect the agreement to be similar to the UAE 
agreement announced last week. Such technology should give AEHI a serious competitive 
advantage.”30 Plans for financing for the proposed projects are unknown, however. 
KEPCO took an early step toward exporting the APR-1400 to the United States by meeting with 
the U.S. NRC November 18, 2009, on possible standard design certification for the reactor. At the 
“initial pre-application meeting,” KEPCP gave a presentation on the Korean nuclear industry, the 
U.S. and Korean work on developing the System 80+ and the APR-1400, and differences between 
the two designs. Prospects for NRC certification of the APR-1400 could presumably be helped by 
its similarity to the previously certified System 80+. However, NRC officials stressed that “this 
meeting did not initiate the review of the APR-1400 design certification and that staff resources 
for this review are not currently in the NRC budget for at least the next two years. Additional 
interactions with KEPCO regarding their plans are expected to occur in the future.”31 
The capacity of the Korean nuclear industry would apparently need to expand to meet MKE’s 
export goals. As noted above, Korea has been completing an average of about one reactor every 
16 months and plans to increase that rate to about one per year after 2021 for the domestic 
market. In addition, Doosan and other firms have been producing major reactor components for 
non-Korean reactors, such as the four Westinghouse AP-1000 units being built in China. To 
export 80 units by 2030, as implied by the MKE goal, the Korean industry would have to 
complete an additional four units per year, a substantial increase over the current rate. However, 
                                               
24 Ann MacLachlan, “Areva Considering Ways of Cutting Costs of EPR Nuclear Reactor,” Platts Commodity News, 
January 11, 2010. 
25 Global Collaborative, “KEPCO/KHNP,” http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/aust-ind-nuclear/
ind-np/muria/countries/kepco. 
26 Taylor Luck, “S. Korean Bidder to Build Nuclear Research Reactor in Jordan,” Jordan Times, April 12, 2009. 
27 “S. Korea, Indonesia Sign Nuclear Cooperation Deal,” Reuters, July 25, 2007. 
28 World Nuclear Association, op. cit. 
29 Reuters, op. cit. 
30 Alternate Energy Holdings Incorporated, “AEHI Expects to Close Deal to Import Korean Reactors in Early 2010,” 
press release, January 4, 2010, http://www.alternateenergyholdings.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
gVVisrNAzgI%3d&tabid=1979. 
31 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Korea Electric Power Corporation APR-1400 Presentation, ML093430109, 
December 9, 2009, http://adamswebsearch.nrc.gov/scripts/securelogin.pl. 
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the total implied construction rate of about five units per year has been achieved by other 
countries in the past, such as France during the 1980s.32 
To expand Korea’s nuclear plant construction and service capacity, MKE has announced plans to 
train 2,800 nuclear technical staff by 2011 and invest $350 million in further design 
improvements, including an increase in research and development personnel. Under the MKE 
plan, South Korea would become completely self-sufficient in nuclear reactor technology by 
2012.33 
U.S. Policy Considerations 
The future direction of U.S.-South Korean cooperation in world energy markets poses a number 
of near- and long-term policy considerations for the United States. U.S. policymakers will face 
decisions related to U.S. nuclear energy cooperation with Korea that will affect broader U.S. 
policy goals. In turn, U.S. decisions based on broad policy goals will have an effect on Korean 
involvement with the U.S. nuclear industry. 
The most immediate potential decision related to these issues will be the Secretary of Energy’s 
judgment on whether to authorize Westinghouse and its employees and contractors to participate 
in the KEPCO reactor sale to the UAE. The so-called 810 Authorization, under Title 10, Part 810, 
of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, is required for any U.S. person to assist in the 
production of special nuclear materials (such as through construction and operation of a nuclear 
power plant) in another country. According to Westinghouse officials, “Westinghouse will submit 
the required application to the U.S. DOE for technology export authorization and Westinghouse 
will be involved in the project as the originator of the technology.”34 
Section 810 implements Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2077), which also 
prohibits nuclear technology export to countries without an agreement for nuclear cooperation 
under Atomic Energy Act Section 123. Under Section 57b, the Secretary of Energy must 
determine that the proposed technology export “will not be inimical to the interest of the United 
States” with the concurrence of the Department of State and after consultation with NRC and the 
Departments of Commerce and Defense. The recently implemented U.S.-UAE 123 agreement 
excludes fuel cycle facilities, such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants, that could 
produce weapon-useable material. South Korea signed its own nuclear cooperation agreement 
with the UAE on June 22, 2009. (For more information about the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement, see 
CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear 
Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.) 
Because of the restrictions in the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement, the 810 authorization for the South 
Korean reactors is likely to raise fewer issues than it might have otherwise. Nevertheless, the 
authorization will undergo a thorough interagency review relating to U.S. interests in the region 
and throughout the world, such as controls on the re-transfer of U.S.-origin nuclear technology 
                                               
32 Arnulf Grubler, An Assessment of the Costs of the French Nuclear PWR Program 1970-2000, International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis, IR-09-036, Laxenburg, Austria, October 6, 2009, p. 8, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/
19721910/Interim-Report-IR-09-036-An-assessment-of-th. 
33 World Nuclear News, op. cit. 
34 Lopatta, op. cit. 
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after it is exported by Korea. Future South Korean exports will be subject to similar 810 reviews 
as long as U.S. companies or individuals are involved. 
The degree to which the United States retains control over the South Korean nuclear program has 
led to proposals for South Korean “nuclear sovereignty.” As reported in the Korean news media, 
the term has been applied to restrictions ranging from the current U.S. prohibition on South 
Korean spent fuel reprocessing to approvals of technology exports, such as the UAE sale. South 
Korean Minister of Knowledge Economy Choi Kyung-hwan recently clarified that the term does 
not refer to nuclear weapons development by using the phrase “peaceful nuclear sovereignty.” 
Choi called the current U.S. restrictions on Korean spent fuel reprocessing “excessive,” and 
pointed to the UAE sale as evidence of, as paraphrased in a Korean news report, “global 
confidence in South Korea’s ability to handle the task.”35 KAERI is conducting a laboratory-scale 
research program on reprocessing spent fuel with an advanced pyroprocessing technique. 
However, the level of consensus over the pyroprocessing option among government agencies, 
Korean electric utilities, and the public remains uncertain. 
The current U.S.-Korea 123 agreement prohibits South Korea from reprocessing any U.S.-origin 
spent fuel, including spent fuel from South Korea’s U.S.-designed reactors, without U.S. 
permission. KAERI’s pyroprocessing technology would partially separate plutonium and uranium 
from spent fuel, but the United States has not allowed the technology to be applied to actual spent 
fuel. The 123 agreement expires in 2014, and some South Korean officials have called for 
significant changes in the reprocessing restrictions, such as the granting of the advance approval 
already given to Japan and Western Europe. According to one Korean news account, the Korean 
reactor sale to the UAE “appears to have boosted efforts to seek a revision” of the U.S.-Korea 
123 agreement.36 Although the issue has the potential to become an irritant in bilateral relations 
between Washington and Seoul, thus far it appears to be a relatively minor one. As of early 2010, 
many experts contacted by CRS describe U.S.-South Korean relations as in their best shape in 
over a decade. 
The United States and South Korea continue to cooperate on nuclear technology development in 
key international forums. Through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), the United 
States, South Korea, and 23 other partner nations (plus 31 observers) are studying world needs for 
nuclear infrastructure development and reliable nuclear fuel supply, including reprocessing 
technology. The United States and South Korea are also founding members of the Generation IV 
International Forum (GIF), a cooperative international research effort on advanced nuclear reactor 
technology. Nuclear energy R&D was a high priority of the George W. Bush Administration. 
Under President Barack Obama, funding has continued for those efforts, although the programs 
have been refocused away from deployment and toward fundamental research. Recent U.S. news 
media reports have indicated that there may be disagreement within the Obama Administration 
over future funding for DOE nuclear energy R&D.37 
Future growth of South Korea’s nuclear energy technology export program would offer 
opportunities for the U.S. nuclear industry as well as significant challenges. As the KEPCO-UAE 
sale makes clear, U.S. companies can directly benefit from participation in Korean export 
projects, in this case an estimated $1 billion for Westinghouse. But the UAE project also 
                                               
35 “Seoul Wants ‘Sovereignty’ in Peaceful Nuclear Development,” Chosun Ilbo, December 31, 2009. 
36 Chosun Ilbo, op. cit. 
37 George Lobsenz, “White House Moves to Restrict DOE Nuclear Research,” Energy Daily, January 15, 2010, p. 1. 
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illustrates the potential competition the U.S. nuclear suppliers may face from Korea, which 
overcame a GE-Hitachi bid in the final round and an earlier Westinghouse proposal. As the South 
Korean nuclear industry develops more reactor components of indigenous design, the 
opportunities for U.S. participation in South Korean export projects may diminish. Government 
ownership of KEPCO may also be a competitive concern for U.S. industry. A World Nuclear 
Association report notes that South Korea may develop a large, exportable reactor design based 
on the APR-1400 with indigenous components by 2015, “though Westinghouse is not likely to let 
it compete in main markets such as USA and China without KEPCO buying the rights to the 
design.”38 Such issues related to South Korean “peaceful nuclear sovereignty” are likely to be a 
topic of continuing U.S.-ROK discussion. 
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